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This paper presents a classification of intrusions with
respect to technique as well as to result. The taxonomy is
intended to be a step on the road to an established taxonomy
of intrusions for use in incident reporting, statistics, warn-
ing bulletins, intrusion detection systems etc. Unlike previ-
ous schemes, it takes the viewpoint of the system owner and
should therefore be suitable to a wider community than that
of system developers and vendors only. It is based on data
from a realistic intrusion experiment, a fact that supports
the practical applicability of the scheme. The paper also
discusses general aspects of classification, and introduces a
concept called dimension. After having made a broad sur-
vey of previous work in the field, we decided to base our
classification of intrusion techniques on a scheme proposed
by Neumann and Parker in 1989 and to further refine rele-
vant parts of their scheme. Our classification of intrusion
results is derived from the traditional three aspects of com-
puter security: confidentiality, availability and integrity.
1. Introduction
The first step in wisdom is to know the things
themselves; this notion consists in having a true idea
of the objects; objects are distinguished and known
by classifying them methodically and giving them
appropriate names. Therefore, classification and
name-giving will be the foundation of our science.
Carolus Linnæus, Systema Naturæ, 1735
The work presented in this paper emanates from intru-
sion experiments that we conducted [20]. The objective of
the experiments was to find operational measures of com-
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puter security, that is measurements which reflect the
dependence on and uncertainty of the operational environ-
ment in a probabilistic way, as opposed to static
measures [25, 7] which reflect instead the quality of the sys-
tem design. The need for a classification scheme arose when
we were refining our modelling of the intrusion
process [11].
Although several classification schemes focusing on dif-
ferent intrusion-related properties have been proposed,
there is still no established taxonomy in general use. When
trying to apply these schemes to our data, we found that
they either focused on aspects other than those we were able
to observe or that they were too superficial to be useful. We
decided to develop a scheme that would fit our data, as well
as be useful to others.
The motivations for a taxonomy and the objectives of the
work are further explained in Section 2, while Section 3 is a
note on the terminology used in this paper. The previous
work in the field is presented in Section 4, the intrusion
experiment is described in Section 5, and Section 6
describes our classification scheme. The advantages and
limitations of the scheme are discussed in Section 7 and,
finally, Section 8 concludes with a summary of the key
points presented in this paper.
2. Rationale and objectives
Why would someone want to devise a taxonomy of intru-
sions? Is there a need for an established taxonomy? What
tangible gain, other than the abstract aesthetic value of ele-
gant expression and order, can justify the efforts required?
Indeed, these are relevant questions, and we have found sev-
eral answers.
• In general, categorizing a phenomenon makes system-
atic studies possible. In particular, a taxonomy of in-
trusions enables us to compile statistics on intrusions,
observe patterns and draw other conclusions from col-
lected intrusion data. We hope that this process will ex-
tend our knowledge of the phenomenon, and that it
will be possible to strengthen systems against intru-
sions using this knowledge.
• An established taxonomy would be useful when re-
porting incidents to incident response teams, such as
the CERT Coordination Center. It could also be used in
the bulletins issued by incident response teams in order
to warn system owners and administrators of new se-
curity flaws that can be exploited in intrusions. (The
CERT Coordination Center has produced an “Incident
Reporting Form” [6] which lists incident categories,
however this does not constitute a proper taxonomy
since it mixes intent, technique, vulnerability and re-
sult categories in an informal manner.)
• If the taxonomy included a grading of the severity or
impact of the intrusion, system owners and administra-
tors would be helped in prioritizing their efforts.
What is required by such a taxonomy? We have identi-
fied some desired (ideal) properties which are worth focus-
ing upon in the formation of the taxonomy.
• The categories in a taxonomy should be mutually ex-
clusive (every specimen should fit in at most one cate-
gory) and collectively exhaustive (every specimen
should fit in at least one category).
• Every category should be accompanied by clear and
unambiguous classification criteria defining what
specimens are to be put in that category.
• The taxonomy should be comprehensible and useful
not only to experts in security but also to users and ad-
ministrators with less knowledge and experience of se-
curity.
• The terminology of the taxonomy should comply with
the established security terminology (something that is
not always easy to define).
Landwehr et al. [14] made an important general observa-
tion:
“A taxonomy is not simply a neutral structure for
categorizing specimens. It implicitly embodies a
theory of the universe from which those specimens
are drawn. It defines what data are to be recorded and
how like and unlike specimens are to be
distinguished.”
Amoroso pointed out the following properties to con-
sider when inventing or selecting an attack taxonomy [1].
• Completeness. The taxonomy should encompass all
possible attacks on the target system.
• Appropriateness. The selected taxonomy should ap-
propriately characterize the attacks to the target sys-
tem, that is any constraints on the taxonomy or on the
system should be specified and considered before ap-
plication.
• Internal versus External Threats. An attack taxonomy
should differentiate attacks that require insider access
to a system from those that can be initiated by external
intruders who may not have gained access to the sys-
tem.
3. A note on terminology
The terms intrusion, penetration, attack, breach and
compromise are often used interchangeably, which can be a
source of misunderstanding. Informally, we consider an
intrusion (or penetration), which is a successful event from
the attacker’s point of view, to consist of: 1) an attack in
which a security flaw (or vulnerability) is exploited, and
2) a breach (or compromise) which is the resulting viola-
tion of the explicit or implicit security policy of the system.
An attack that does not lead to a breach is considered unsuc-
cessful, although it may provide the attacker with some
information, at least that the attempted attack does not work
for some reason. However, the distinction between breach
and intrusion is neither strict nor crucially important for the
following discussion.
We have adopted a wide view of the system concept,
according to which users can sometimes be considered part
of the system or at least seen as part of the system context
or environment. This is common in the field of safety
engineering [22] and we also find it necessary to the secu-
rity perspective. One reason for including users in the sys-
tem concept is that sometimes an attack will be successful
only when there are other users in the system who unknow-
ingly interact with the attacker. For example, if an attacker
plants a Trojan horse, it must be run by a credulous user in
order to work. Another reason for adopting a holistic view
of the system, rather than studying separate components
when analysing intrusions, is that it is usually not important
to the attacker how or where the intrusion is made, as long
as the result is the desired one.
4. Previous work
Through the years, several classifications of intrusions
have been presented, some concentrated on the intruders
and their methods (that is the threat or intrusion technique)
and others on the characteristics of the computer system
that make the intrusion possible (that is the vulnerability or
security flaw). The latter classifications do not usually take
into account the exploitation of the categorized flaws, while
the former often describe the exploited flaw in conjunction
with the exploitation technique. For the sake of complete-
ness, both types of classification are included in this survey
of previous work.2
4.1. Classifications of intrusion techniques and
threats
An early work is that of Lackey, in which six categories
of penetration techniques were presented [13]. The classifi-
cation is “based on many examples of actual system pene-
tration”, although no references are presented.
Neumann and Parker categorized computer misuse tech-
niques into nine classes on the basis of data from about
3,000 computer abuse cases collected by the two authors
over a period of 20 years [19]. The authors emphasize that
their classes are not mutually exclusive in the sense that
actual computer abuse cases often involve techniques from
several classes. The classes are listed in Table 1. The order
is roughly from the physical world (Class NP1) to the hard-
ware (Class NP2) to the software (Class NP3 and higher),
and from unauthorized use to misuse of authority.
We found the classification suggested by Neumann and
Parker interesting since it appears to be well-founded and to
cover most of the known techniques. It also has an elegant
feature, namely the inherent grading of the classes, from
external attacks to authorized users misusing their privi-
leges. It is not perfect, however, and some of its shortcom-
ings are discussed in Section 7 (Neumann presented a
revised and extended version of the scheme [18], but we
prefer the original version since the new scheme does not
clearly separate technique from vulnerability or result).
Brinkley and Schell [5] categorized what they call infor-
mation-oriented computer misuse (regarding the security
aspects confidentiality and integrity, but not availability,
which the authors call resource-oriented computer misuse)
into six different classes, which are not mutually exclusive.
No specific support for the classification scheme is pre-
sented, except for a small number of examples from other
cited references.
In his Ph.D. thesis, Kumar made a classification of intru-
sions based on the “signatures” (patterns) they leave in the
audit trail of the system [12]. The classification is intended
for use in intrusion detection systems based on pattern
matching. Consequently, it does not consider intrusions that
do not leave tracks in the audit trail, for example passive
wiretapping.
4.2. Classifications of security flaws
In a general sense, a security flaw in a computer system
is a kind of “bug”. Beizer presented a taxonomy of bugs that
concentrates on where in the software development process
the bug is introduced [3].
Table 1. Computer misuse techniques [19].
Class Description
NP1 External misuse Generally nontechnological and unobserved, physically separate
from computer and communication facilities, for example visual
spying.
NP2 Hardware misuse a) Passive, with no (immediate) side effects.
b) Active, with side effects.
NP3 Masquerading Impersonation; playback and spoofing attacks etc.
NP4 Setting up subsequent misuse Planting and arming malicious software.
NP5 Bypassing intended controls Circumvention of existing controls or improper acquisition of other-
wise denied authority.
NP6 Active misuse of resources Misuse of (apparently) conferred authority that alters the system or
its data.
NP7 Passive misuse of resources Misuse of (apparently) conferred reading authority.
NP8 Misuse resulting from inaction Failure to avert a potential problem in a timely fashion, or an error
of omission, for example.
NP9 Use as an indirect aid in
committing other misuse
a) As a tool in planning computer misuse etc.
b) As a tool in planning criminal/unethical activity.3
Landwehr et al. constructed a taxonomy of computer
program security flaws, exemplified with 50 documented
case studies of security flaws in different computing
environments [14]. The flaws are categorized with respect
to three characteristics or, as we suggest, in three dimen-
sions. The dimensions are genesis (how did the flaw enter
the system?), time of introduction (when did it enter the sys-
tem?) and location (where in the system is it manifested?).
In a classic article, Saltzer and Schroeder present eight
design principles for protection mechanisms, one of them
being the well-known principle of least privilege [23].
Starting from these principles, and using UNIX as an exam-
ple of an “unsecure operating system”, Hogan categorized
security flaws in stand-alone systems and distributed
environments [9]. This classification is chiefly concerned
with why the flaws are present in the system.
Based on 49 cases in which UNIX security faults have
led to intrusions, Aslam devised a taxonomy of security
faults, as well as a design of a database for vulnerability
data [2]. Aslam provides selection criteria that enable a dis-
tinct classification of the 49 cases. Only faults embodied in
software are included.
5. The intrusion experiment
This section briefly outlines the arrangement of the
experiment; for details see Olovsson et al. [20]. The target
system consisted of a set of 24 SUN ELC diskless worksta-
tions connected to one file-server, all running SunOS 4.1.2.
The attackers were 24 undergraduate students taking a
course in applied computer security. They were all legal
users of the system with normal user privileges and with
physical access to all workstations except the file-server.
During this time, the system was in operational use for
other laboratory courses taken by undergraduate students at
the Department of Computer Engineering. The system itself
was a ‘standard’ configuration, and thus not expected to dif-
fer significantly from other similar systems in use; it was
supervised by an experienced system administrator. All
standard monitoring and accounting features were enabled
in the system to allow us to monitor the activities of each
user account and to measure the resources each attacker
spent during the breach process.
Through questionnaires, we know that the attackers did
not consider themselves particularly knowledgeable about
computer security issues compared with other students of
the Computer Science and Engineering program, except for
a certain degree of interest which made them choose to take
the course in the first place. The attackers worked in groups
of two. It was a deliberate choice to let ‘normal’ users attack
the system, as opposed to professional attackers with expe-
rience from other systems. The attackers were informed that
some specific activities were prohibited, namely doing
physical damage to the system, attacking other systems,
cooperating between groups or affecting the operation of
other users on the system without first consulting the exper-
iment coordinator. All attacking activities were to be care-
fully documented and reported to the coordinator.
A major motivation for the attackers was that the exper-
iment was a compulsory part of the course they were taking.
They were also given a general description of the overall
objectives of the experiment so that they had a complete
understanding of why certain rules must be obeyed, and
why and in what way they should report their actions.
The attackers were told that a breach occurs whenever
the attackers succeed in doing something they are not nor-
mally allowed to do, for example to use another user’s
account. It is still somewhat difficult to determine objec-
tively whether a given event is a valid breach or not but,
after analysis of attacker reports and system logs, we have
acknowledged some 60 separate, valid breaches in this
experiment.
6. Taxonomy
6.1. Introduction
When examining specimens for classification, it should
be noted that the specimens often have many different
attributes, any of which could be chosen as the basis of the
classification. We suggest the use of the term dimension for
such an attribute. Accordingly, it is important to decide
exactly what dimension of an intrusion the classification
should be based on, because there are indeed several possi-
bilities: the system component that was attacked; the intent
of the attacker; the technique used in the attack; the reason
why the exploited flaw is present in the system; the outcome
of the intrusion etc. Some classification schemes make this
point very clear (for example [14]), while others are less
specific.
When we tried to categorize the flaws exploited in our
recorded intrusions according to the scheme of Landwehr et
al. [14], we found that the only feasible dimension, based
on the information we had, was location. Since neither the
details of the system development process nor the source
code was available to us, only a minority of the flaws could
be categorized with respect to genesis or time of introduc-
tion. Furthermore, for many of our recorded intrusions, it is
not a trivial task to determine the actual flaw. Consider for
example the scenario in which an attacker feeds the pass-
word file to a password-guessing program that tries words
from various dictionaries. What is the vulnerability that
makes this attack possible? Is it the fact that every user can
read the encrypted passwords in the password file? Or is it4
the fact that some users tend to choose easy-to-guess pass-
words? Or is the encryption method not sufficiently sophis-
ticated? Or is a single reusable password simply insufficient
for the authentication of users?
We would like to be able to make a classification from
the system owner’s point of view. That is why we focus on
the external observations of attacks and breaches which the
system owner can make. An owner of a system is usually
unable to categorize security flaws in detail. This is because
most of the software and hardware is purchased from sys-
tem vendors; source code and internal design is most often
proprietary and not available from the vendor.
We believe that the dimensions of an intrusion that are
most interesting to system owners are intrusion techniques
and intrusion results. Details of the intrusion technique are
needed to gain an understanding of intruders and the threat
that system owners face. In addition, with this knowledge,
it is often possible for the administrator to apply a quick fix
to stop further intrusions of this kind while waiting for a
patch from the vendor. This quick fix can be, for example,
to clear the set-user-id bit of a flawed program or to remove
a service completely (this usually has a negative impact on
the service to legal users of the system). Information about
the intrusion result is needed for the system owner to judge
how critical the intrusion is according to the security policy
of the system. For example, in some systems, disclosure of
confidential information is considered much worse than
denial of service while, in other systems, it is exactly the
opposite. Another important field of application for data on
intrusion results and techniques is the design of intrusion
detection systems.
Our classification of intrusion techniques is presented in
Table 2 and our classification of intrusion results in Table 3.
For each category of the two dimensions, we give the num-
ber of intrusions from our experiment that fit in the cate-
gory. The number is zero in some categories; nevertheless
they are included as we believe that such intrusions are pos-
sible, although they did not occur in this particular experi-
ment. The dimensions and their categories are explained
and illustrated with examples below.
6.2. Intrusion techniques
As the scheme of Neumann and Parker [19] appeared to
be the most useful of the previous classifications of intru-
sion techniques, our first step was to try to classify the intru-
sions made during the experiment in those classes. Since all
attackers in our experiment were authorized users of the
system, we expected that most of the intrusions would fit
into the higher classes. The result was that all of the intru-
sions could be entered in class NP5, NP6 or NP7 (see
Table 1). Our goal was a more fine-grained partitioning,
however; thus our next step was to define subclasses below
the three classes in the Neumann and Parker scheme.
6.2.1. Category NP5: Bypass of intended controls
The category bypass of intended controls was divided
into three subclasses: password attacks, spoofing privileged
programs, and utilizing weak authentication.
Password attacks, as already pointed out by Neumann
and Parker, is a broad subclass that includes all intrusions in
which passwords are in some way involved. We decided to
further divide this subclass into the third-level categories
capture and guessing, since different countermeasures
apply to the two techniques. Spoofing privileged programs
is a technique in which programs executing with higher
privileges are tricked to perform illicit operations on behalf
of the attacker. Utilizing weak authentication is the tech-
nique of taking advantage of the fact that the system does
not perform proper authentication of the originator of cer-
tain requests. Examples of this subclass include: obtaining
client root privileges by manipulating the boot process,
obtaining server root privileges by executing a set-user-id
program generated by a client root, sending e-mail with
faked headers by manually interacting with the mailer dae-
mon, and other situations in which the system trusts an iden-
tification without requiring any authentication token at all.
6.2.2. Category NP6: Active misuse of resources
The category active misuse of resources was divided into
the two subclasses exploiting inadvertent write permission
and resource exhaustion.
Exploiting inadvertent write permission includes exploi-
tation of the fact that many system objects are by default
world writable. This means that any user on the system can
modify these objects, although this is seldom the system (or
object) owner’s intention; it is the same for group writable
objects. These objects are often found by using the tech-
niques of category NP7. Resource exhaustion is a technique
used to cause denial of service, for example by consuming
all available disk space. UNIX is very susceptible to this
kind of attack, but it is often easy to track down the source
of the problem [21], making the attack only temporarily
useful. The participants in the intrusion experiment were
explicitly told not to use an attack of this kind, for example
the command “while true fork()”, which would effec-
tively stop other users from starting new processes. If they
had more innovative ideas for denial of service attacks that
could not be traced, such attacks could be tried after discus-
sion with the experiment coordinator at times when no nor-
mal users were present.5
Table 2. Taxonomy of intrusions: Intrusion techniques.
Category Number ofintrusions
NP5
Bypassing
intended
controls
Password attacks
Capture 6
Guessing 12
Spoofing privileged programs 6
Utilizing weak authentication 13
NP6 Active
misuse of
resources
Exploiting inadvertent write permission 12
Resource exhaustion 0
NP7 Passive
misuse of
resources
Manual browsing 1
Automated searching
Using a personal tool 0
Using a publicly
available tool 8
Table 3. Taxonomy of intrusions: Intrusion results.
Category Number ofintrusions
Exposure
Disclosure of
confidential
information
Only user information disclosed 0
System (and user) information disclosed 10
Service to
unauthorized
entities
Access as an ordinary user account 19
Access as a special system account 0
Access as client root 3
Access as server root 5
Denial of service
Selective
Affects a single user at a time 2
Affects a group of users 0
Unselective Affects all users of the system 2
Transmitted Affects users of other systems 0
Erroneous output
Selective
Affects a single user at a time 6
Affects a group of users 0
Unselective Affects all users of the system 8
Transmitted Affects users of other systems 36
6.2.3. Category NP7: Passive misuse of resources
The category passive misuse of resources is the “read”
counterpart of NP6. It is natural to divide the techniques
into manual browsing and automated searching; the latter
involves the use of a special tool program designed to find
security problems in a system. Such a program can be either
constructed by the attacker for the particular attack or a gen-
eral tool fetched from a public archive. Several such tools
are available, for example COPS [8], which was a popular
instrument among the participants in our experiment. The
formation of third-level categories for distinction between
publicly available tools and personal tools is motivated by
detection mechanisms. It is often easy to design an intrusion
detection system to recognize the characteristics of a public
tool, while this is more difficult for tools that are previously
unknown (compare with the problem of virus detection).
6.3. Intrusion results
What are the consequences of an intrusion? This ques-
tion is more difficult to answer than might appear at first
glance. Usually, it is meaningful to consider only the imme-
diate result that characterizes a breach, because the total
outcome of an intrusion depends on how the attackers move
on from the initial breach. For example, if the attackers gain
root access on the file-server, they can do virtually anything
to the system and the final consequences are impossible to
assess completely. In our intrusion experiment, the attackers
were told to stop when they had obtained the desired higher
privileges, as we did not want them to disturb the work of
ordinary system users [20]. In terms of real-time intrusion
detection, another reason for concentrating on the immedi-
ate result is that it is desirable to detect the intrusion and
take preemptive action as early as possible, preferably
before any damage is done [10].
However, it is not obvious what should be considered the
immediate result. A typical example is password-guessing.
The very first result of a successful password-guessing
attack is that the attackers gain knowledge of the user’s
password. A password is not just any piece of information,
however, because the immediate implication is access to the
user’s account on the system. We decided to adopt a practi-
cal point of view, whereby we consider the result of a pass-
word-guessing attack to be access to the account in
question.
Another example is the planting of a Trojan horse. The
initial event is a modification or creation of an object in the
system but, if the Trojan horse is never activated by a cred-
ulous user or system process, there is no detrimental result
from the system owner’s point of view. Consequently, we
consider the result of the activation of the Trojan horse to be
the result of the intrusion (although it would be desirable to
detect the presence of the Trojan horse before it is acti-
vated). This example also illustrates that there is no point in
considering intent when categorizing results. The creation
and insertion of the Trojan horse is most likely done with
malicious intent, but the activation can be considered an
accident. Although we are concerned primarily with inten-
tional attacks, the same results could in fact be caused by
accidents (see [18] for more examples).
We decided to base our classification of intrusion results
on the three traditional aspects of computer security: confi-
dentiality, availability and integrity. The aspect of confiden-
tiality is extended as suggested by Meadows [15] to
exclusivity, to denote not only protection against unautho-
rized access to confidential information, but also protection
against unauthorized use of the system. A breach of exclu-
sivity results in exposure, a breach of availability results in
denial of service and a breach of integrity results in errone-
ous output. Those are the top-level categories of our classi-
fication of intrusion results.
6.3.1. Exposure
The exposure category is naturally divided into the sub-
classes disclosure of confidential information and service to
unauthorized entities.
Disclosure of confidential information is further divided
into the third-level categories only user information dis-
closed and system (and user) information disclosed, since
we believe that cases of the former class sometimes (but not
always) can be considered less severe than those of the lat-
ter. Examples of disclosure of confidential information
include the following.
Reading backup tapes The tape streamer used for
backups of the file-server was world-readable. The attackers
in our experiment discovered that tapes were automatically
ejected immediately after the backup procedure had fin-
ished writing to the tape. However, old tapes were reused
and could be read from the time the tape was inserted to the
start of the backup procedure. The result was that an older
copy of the entire contents of the server’s disks could be
read by anyone on the system. (Result: system (and user)
information disclosed; Technique: manual browsing).
Spoofing ARP The program /etc/arp runs with the
effective group id of kmem and, when a file which is read-
able to this group, for example /dev/kmem or
/dev/eeprom, is fed to the program, parts of the file will
be displayed as syntax error messages. (Result: system (and
user) information disclosed; Technique: spoofing privileged
programs).
Service to unauthorized entities is divided into third-
level categories reflecting the privileges associated with the
service delivered. The category access as an ordinary user
account concerns either a legal user of the system who gains
access to another user’s account, or an outsider who gains7
access to any user account on the system. Access as a spe-
cial system account means an account with higher privi-
leges than an ordinary user account, but not super-user
(root) access. An example from UNIX is bin or any other
account that owns system files. The reason why we make a
distinction between access as client root and access as
server root is that in most client-server environments, the
super-user on a client host has no special privileges on the
server host. This is because users often have complete phys-
ical access to the client workstations, and consequently can
manipulate the hosts in many different ways; they can
reboot the machines, connect or replace storage devices or
network connection cables etc. In fact, workstations to
which the users have complete physical access cannot be
trusted at all, although this is ignored in many systems (with
the exception of the root identity on the server as mentioned
above). This was realized in MIT’s Project Athena, where
the root password for the public workstations was not even
kept secret; Kerberos was developed instead and used for
user authentication [24]. Examples of service to unautho-
rized entities include the following.
Automated password-guessing The use of an auto-
mated tool for password-guessing based on dictionaries of
likely passwords, a widely discussed and utilized technique,
was also successfully used in our experiment. Many user
accounts with simple passwords were compromised, but the
root password was never guessed. (Result: access as an
ordinary user account; Technique: password attacks—
guessing).
Manipulating the boot process Several attackers tried
to reboot a client host in single-user mode. Since this was
successfully utilized in an earlier experiment to gain client
root access, the system administrator had enabled the
PROM password feature of the workstations to prevent this
type of attack. However, some attackers found a method by
which they could still reboot the host in single-user mode to
become client root without being prompted for a password.
(Result: access as client root; Technique: utilizing weak
authentication).
6.3.2. Denial of service
The subclasses selective and unselective for denial of
service were suggested by Needham [17]. The third-level
categories should be self-explanatory. By transmitted, we
mean that the intrusion affects the service delivered by other
systems to their users, not the service delivered by our sys-
tem to other systems. In the latter case, other systems can in
fact be seen as users of our system. There were no intrusions
that caused denial of service on other systems in the exper-
iment, but such intrusions are indeed possible. For example,
an attacker can make a host on the system use the same IP
address as a host on another system, something which nor-
mally causes both hosts to lose contact with the network.
The possible range of this particular attack depends on the
network configuration [4]. We have not separated transmit-
ted attacks as selective or unselective, because it is difficult
to define what unselective would mean for a transmitted
attack, especially for the denial of service category. We
hope that it is not possible for a computer on the Internet to
cause denial of service on all connected systems (although
the result of the Internet Worm incident in 1988 was too
close for comfort). An example of denial of service is given
here.
Causing a crash by remote copy to audio device There
was a bug that caused a machine to crash immediately if the
remote copy command rcp was invoked with the target
/dev/audio. If executed on the server, the whole system
would go down. This was clearly a system bug, but the
audio device should not be readable or writable to any user
except the user currently logged in at the console. (Result:
unselective; Technique: exploiting inadvertent write per-
mission).
6.3.3. Erroneous output
In the formation of the erroneous output category, it soon
became evident that the same subcategories could be used
as in the denial of service category. “Output” is used in a
wide sense, and denotes more than what is shown on the
user’s terminal or sent on a network connection. Modifica-
tions of system objects, such as the contents of files on hard
disks or data structures in main memory, are also considered
as “output”, and when that output is the result of an intru-
sion, the intrusion belongs to this category. Examples of
erroneous output include the following.
Spoofing Xterm The X Windows terminal program
xterm, running with the effective user id of root, had a
flawed logging facility (CERT Advisory CA-93:17) which
could be used to create any file or append to any existing
file. Although this could be used to gain access as server
root, we categorized the result as erroneous output, which
was the immediate result. Our decision is supported by the
fact that it is not obvious how to move on from the first step,
that is to gain root access. (Result: unselective; Technique:
spoofing privileged programs).
Faking e-mail By manually communicating with the
mailer daemon, attackers can send e-mail messages with
faked headers, particularly false sender identity, to any other
system on the Internet. (Result: transmitted; Technique: uti-
lizing weak authentication).
7. Discussion
The classification of intrusion techniques proposed by
Neumann and Parker [19] is of course not perfect, nor is our
extension of their scheme. It can be discussed for example8
whether all kinds of attacks involving passwords in one way
or another should actually belong in class NP5, as stated by
Neumann and Parker, or whether some belong in class NP7.
Another problem, which always accompanies attempts to
classify human behaviour, is how to obtain an unambiguous
classification. The classification of intrusion techniques
indirectly involves the intentions of the system owner and of
the attacker, which are not always clear and logical. There-
fore, it is sometimes a question of interpretation as to
whether a certain intrusion belongs in one class or the other,
or in both. Our subclasses are designed to be mutually
exclusive with respect to technique but, as noted by Neu-
mann and Parker, an actual case of abuse is often complex
and involves several techniques. As observed by
Meadows [16], it depends on the level of abstraction
whether an action that is part of an attack is considered
atomic or complex.
The classification of intrusion results is perhaps easier in
the sense that the classes are in all essential respects mutu-
ally exclusive. The problem here lies in determining what it
is meaningful to consider as the outcome of the intrusion, as
discussed in Section 6.3. Although it would probably be
desirable to include a grading of the severity of the intru-
sions, this is often a subjective and system-dependent prop-
erty; it is therefore left to system owners who can judge how
severe a particular result category is in their system, accord-
ing to their security policy.
A significant question is whether our scheme is applica-
ble to other systems and circumstances besides those of the
experiment from which it was derived. Our proposed
answer is based on the properties specified by Amoroso [1],
as cited in Section 2.
• As to the result dimension, we believe that, with our
definition of exposure, the top and second levels of our
taxonomy satisfy Amoroso’s completeness and appro-
priateness properties for most systems. The third level
is more specialized and may fit only similar systems.
We do not find any reason to differentiate between in-
ternal and external attacks in the result dimension,
since the results can be the same regardless of the ori-
gin of the attack. For example, an intrusion in which an
outsider guesses a user password and logs in as that
user is categorized as exposure – service to unautho-
rized entities – access as an ordinary user account.
• The technique dimension is less general, as it is an ex-
tension of a more general scheme. For the system in
our experiment, it is complete and appropriate. Since
many systems in industrial and academic environ-
ments are very similar to our experimental system, we
believe that our scheme is likely to have a wide field of
application. Our experiment concerns only internal at-
tacks, however external attacks are intended to fit in
the lower classes of the Neumann and Parker scheme.
Although the size of the experiment is too small to draw
strong conclusions about distribution in general, it is still
interesting to examine the number of intrusions in the
classes of the two dimensions we have studied. Figure 1
shows this distribution and is also a clear illustration of why
the term dimension is appropriate. The figure shows that
some techniques have a one-to-one correspondence to the
result, while other techniques can be used to reach many
different kinds of results.
Figure 1. Distribution of intrusions in the two dimensions.
Intrusion technique
NP5-pc NP5-pg NP5-spp NP5-uwa NP6-eiwp NP6-re NP7-mb NP7-pers NP7-publ
In
tru
si
on
 re
su
lt
exposure-disclosure-user
exposure-disclosure-system 1 1 8
exposure-service-user 4 12 3
exposure-service-system
exposure-service-client 3
exposure-service-server 2 3
denial of service-sel-single 2
denial of service-sel-group
denial of service-unsel 2
denial of service-transm
err output-sel-single 1 5
err output-sel-group
err output-unsel 5 3
err output-transm 39
8. Conclusions
We have presented a classification scheme for computer
security intrusions, in which the classification is made with
respect to the intrusion technique and the intrusion result,
with the needs of system owners and administrators in
mind. By using data from a realistic intrusion experiment,
we have shown that the scheme is likely to be generally
applicable. We believe that the proposed scheme will, with
further application, evaluation and refinement, be a good
candidate for a generally accepted taxonomy of intrusions.
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